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Collective Action Clauses as a 
Solution to Holdouts in Puerto Rico’s 
Unique Debt Crisis: Lessons Learned 
from Argentina 
Sumer B. Marquette  
Abstract: On June 30, 2016, in a controversial and bipartisan effort, the Puerto 
Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) was 
signed into law to address the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis. At 
the time, Puerto Rico’s government and its agencies had $72 billion in debt. 
However, Puerto Rico’s status as a U.S. territory disqualified the island from fil-
ing for court-arranged bankruptcy under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and from 
seeking emergency assistance from the International Monetary Fund. As a re-
sult, PROMESA was enacted to create a structure for exercising federal over-
sight over the fiscal affairs of the territory by establishing an Oversight Board, a 
process for restructuring debt, and expedited procedures for approving critical 
infrastructure projects. This Note focuses on PROMESA’s Title VI retroactive 
inclusion of collective action clauses (CACs). Following the landmark decision 
in NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, CACs gained widespread appeal 
because they effectively safeguard against a perverse holdout incentive in the 
restructuring process. CACs expedite the restructuring process by allowing a 
supermajority of bondholders to agree to a debt restructuring that is legally 
binding on all bondholders. This Note concludes that Title VI’s inclusion of 
CACs is a normatively desirable result. When applied to the Puerto Rican debt 
crisis, CACs will likely mitigate the risk of holdouts and incentivize vulture funds 
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Currently, global government debt is over $57 trillion and every sec-
ond a government adds debt.1 This debt is issued by public authorities, cit-
ies, states, federal governments, and sovereign states. Although global debt 
continues to increase, sovereign borrowers have been defaulting on the re-
payment of their debt for as long as there has been an international banking 
system.2 Yet, there remains no effective procedure for managing sovereign 
defaults and enforcing the numerous sovereign debt contracts.3 The lack of 
                                                     
1 The Global Debt Clock, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/content/global_debt 
_clock (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). 
2 Clifford Dammers, A Brief History of Sovereign Defaults and Rescheduling, in Default 
and Rescheduling: Corporate and Sovereign Borrowers in Difficulty 77 (David Suratgar ed., 
1984). 
3 Yuefen Li, Rodrigo Olvares-Caminal, & Ugo Panizza, Avoiding Avoidable Debt Crisis: 
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an international legal structure to deal with sovereign debt defaults is one of 
the most important aspects of sovereign debt. 
When a government defaults on its debt, in addition to the creditors 
and the economy, the sovereign’s residents are also significantly affected. 
This is due to a redistribution of national wealth, which includes the pen-
sions and public services provided by the government and its instrumentali-
ties.4 Some defaults result in the shuttering of public utilities and other gov-
ernment services. The involvement of a government in the issuance of debt 
introduces a geopolitical dimension into the financial relationship. This fur-
ther heightens the need for effective restructuring. With market interest in 
sovereign and territory borrowing continuously increasing and sovereign 
debt remaining unenforceable by creditors who cannot attach assets located 
within the borders of the defaulting territory, one can assume more disas-
trous scenarios are likely right around the corner.  
  The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is faced with a startling fiscal and 
humanitarian crisis. The government and its various agencies owe around 
$72 billion in outstanding debt.5 On the brink of default because of strained 
liquidity and virtually depleted resources, Puerto Rico was faced with 
choosing between paying its bondholders or providing essential services to 
its residents.6 Although the Puerto Rican government introduced several 
measures to address the deteriorating fiscal situation, the measures were in-
sufficient to stabilize the government’s finances.7 One effect of the default 
has been the closing of public utilities and a decrease in government ser-
vices. 
Puerto Rico is a unique example because of its status as a U.S. territory 
and its convoluted relationship with the United States, which renders it inel-
igible to file court-arranged bankruptcy. This territorial status is a serious 
problem. The objective of organized bankruptcy procedures is to assure the 
protection of the interests of both debtors and creditors. Further, unlike sov-
ereign nations, Puerto Rico cannot seek emergency assistance from the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (“IMF”). In order to prevent financial crises, the 
IMF lends to countries to give the country breathing room to restore finan-
cial stability.8 This lending is often accompanied with a set of corrective 
                                                                                                                           
Lessons From Recent Defaults, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WILL THIS 
TIME BE DIFFERENT? 243, 244 (Carlos A. Primo Braga & Gallina A. Vincelette eds., 2011). 
4 MAURO MEGLIANI, SOVEREIGN DEBT: GENESIS – RESTRUCTURING – LITIGATION 3 (2015).  
5 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”): Over-
view and Restructuring Issues, PUERTO RICO REPORT 5 (Aug. 9, 2016), 
http://www.puertoricoreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/57f390ed745f9.pdf. 
6 Id. 
7 See ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44095, PUERTO RICO’S CURRENT FISCAL 
CHALLENGES 1 (2016). 
8 IMF Lending, International Monetary Fund, 1 http://www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/IMF-
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policy actions.9 However, this support is only available to the one-hundred 
eighty-nine IMF member countries upon their request.10 
To address the Puerto Rican debt crisis, on June 30, 2016, the U.S. 
Congress adopted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
Stability Act (“PROMESA”), which President Barack Obama signed into 
law.11 PROMESA created a structure for exercising federal oversight over 
Puerto Rico’s fiscal affairs by establishing an Oversight Board with broad 
budgetary and financial powers over Puerto Rico.12 Additionally, 
PROMESA provides the legal basis to adjust the outstanding bonded debt 
through a court-supervised process. This paper focuses specifically on Title 
VI, §601 that provides the Oversight Board the authority to retroactively in-
troduce collective action clauses (“CACs”) to individual creditor contracts 
on Puerto Rico’s outstanding bonded debt.13 CACs have been used to expe-
dite the restructuring of sovereign debt by allowing a supermajority of 
bondholders to agree to a debt restructuring that is legally binding on all 
bondholders. 
In response to the Southern District of New York’s groundbreaking 
decision in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (“NML Capital”), 
CACs became a common feature in sovereign bonds to combat vulture 
funds that were successfully able to holdout and block effective restructur-
ing during Argentina’s debt crisis.14 Vulture funds are bondholders who 
strategically buy sovereign debt at massive discounts when the sovereign is 
in distress. Once the sovereign defaults, the vulture fund sues to get the full 
value of the original bond.15 Holdout bondholders successfully sued Argen-
tina for breach of a pari passu covenant and obtained injunctive remedies to 
enforce judgment against Argentina.16  
The court held that the holdout creditors could access Argentina’s 
overseas assets because Argentina failed to comply with its promise to treat 
holders of the defaulted issues equally in repayment with holders of the lat-
                                                                                                                           
Lending?pdf=1.  
9 Id. at 2. 
10 Id.; List of Members, International Monetary Fund, (Last updated Mar. 7, 2017) 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm.  
11 PROMESA has been codified in 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2241. 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2012 WL 5895784 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). 
15 See Alexandria L. Todd, Defaulting the Purpose: The Future of Foreign Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring in the Wake of Argentina’s Debt Crisis, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 269, 274 
(2015). 
16 See Tim Samples, Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt: Argentina, Vulture Funds, and Pari 
Passu Under New York Law, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 49, 76 (2014). 
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er issues under the pari passu clause.17 The court’s holding sent shock 
waves through the sovereign debt markets and created a perverse holdout 
incentive by paying holdouts more than cooperators in sovereign debt re-
structuring.18   
Due to Puerto Rico’s minefield of competing interests19 from various 
debt issuers backed by different revenue streams and its current defaulting 
state, CACs are the best option for creditors to receive the most effective 
modifications to the essential payment terms of Puerto Rico’s sovereign 
bond contracts. PROMESA’s retroactive introduction of CACs to individu-
al creditor contracts on Puerto Rico’s outstanding bonded debt will safe-
guard against a perverse holdout incentive in the restructuring process. If 
correctly utilized, CACs will ensure that the government, the various credi-
tors, and the residents of Puerto Rico reach a favorable outcome in combat-
ting the enormous debt crisis.  
II. SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS 
A. Overview  
Sovereign debt includes debts owed, guaranteed, or secured by a sov-
ereign state or an agency or instrumentality of the state and can originate 
from various obligations.20 Sovereign debt may be owed to domestic and 
foreign creditors.21 Sovereign loans fall into different categories: direct or 
indirect; bilateral or multilateral; secured or non-secured; and public or pri-
vate.22 Sovereign loans are unique due to the parties involved. The parties 
are among the most sophisticated in the global financial market. They deal 
in an enormous amount of money and trade on an active secondary market. 
The final unique feature of sovereign debt is the absence of a meaningful 
regulatory body.23  
According to Standard & Poor’s, default on a debt contract occurs if a 
payment is not made within any grace period specified in the contract or if 
debts are rescheduled on terms less favorable than those specified in the 
                                                     
17 Id. at 76-77. 
18 See John A. E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout: International Certifi-
cation Boards for Sovereign-Debt Restructuring, 49 TEX. INT’L L. J. 221, 230 (2014). 
19 See generally Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Debt Fix Unlikely to Resemble Detroit’s, 
REUTERS, (Sept. 5, 2016) available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-
controlboard-analysis-idUSKCN11B2F5. 
20 MEGLIANI, supra note 4, at 4. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 55. 
23 Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The 
View from the Legal Academy: Innovation in Boilerplate contracts: An Empirical Examina-
tion of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 930 (2004). 
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original contract.24 Most default episodes are triggered by one or more of 
the following factors:  
a worsening of the terms of trade; an increase in international borrow-
ing costs; consistently poor macroeconomic policies, leading to a building 
up of vulnerabilities; or a crisis in a systemic country that causes contagion 
across goods and financial markets.25   
Sovereign debt restructuring can be defined is an exchange of out-
standing sovereign debt instruments, such as loans or bonds, for new debt 
instruments or cash through a formal process.26 The purpose of the restruc-
turing is to agree on the terms of a debt exchange that will provide some 
form of debt relief and solve the distressed situation. Ideally, this restructur-
ing would allow the sovereign to return to the international capital market 
as soon as possible. Generally, there are two types of operations in a debt 
restructuring: debt rescheduling and debt reduction. Both involve a “hair-
cut” in the present value of creditor claims.27 Debt rescheduling is the 
lengthening of maturity of the old instrument, whereas debt reduction re-
duces the nominal face value of the old instrument.28  
Although sovereign debt restructuring can occur preemptively, before 
the government misses a payment, most restructuring occurs after a default. 
The first known instance of sovereign debt restructuring after default can be 
traced back to the loan made by the Greek sanctuary of Delos in the fourth 
century BC to States of the Attic League, in which only a small portion of 
the loan was reimbursed.29  
Sovereign debt restructuring is usually very time-consuming and cost-
ly. The average sovereign debt restructuring takes, on average, almost a 
decade for the entire process to conclude.30 The duration of negotiations for 
foreign creditors often takes much longer than domestic creditors. In addi-
tion to the lengthy process, Mark Wright notes that on average, private 
creditors lose 40% of the value of their claim, and debtor countries exit de-
fault as or more highly indebted than when they entered default.31  
Before the rise of vulture funds, even without a structured way to man-
                                                     
24 MARK L. J. WRIGHT, Restructuring Sovereign Debts with Private Sector Creditors: Theory 
and Practice, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WILL THIS TIME BE 
DIFFERENT? 295, 297 (Carlos A. Primo Braga & Gallina A. Vincelette eds., 2011). 
25 UDAIBIR S. DAS, MICHAEL G. PAPAIOANNOU, & CHRISTOPH TREBESCH, Restructuring Sov-
ereign Debt: Lessons from Recent History, in FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND POLICY RESPONSES 593, 596 (Stijn Claessens, et al. eds. 2014). 
26 Id. at 594 (although there is no universally accepted definition). 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 MEGLIANI, supra note 4, at 9, & n.3. 
30 See WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 295. 
31 Id. 
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age the defaults, the restructuring process was relatively predictable and 
fairly stable.32 The sovereign entity would engage in some form of negotia-
tions with its creditors to agree on the terms of a debt exchange. The sover-
eign entity would usually identify the holders of the claims, initiate a dia-
logue with them, and the creditors would then decide whether to accept or 
reject the offer. Before the rise of vulture funds, most creditors accepted the 
restructuring offer and took a haircut to their claim in order to avoid a size-
able loss from a default.   
B. Types of Sovereign Debt 
In any restructuring process, the priority rules for payments to credi-
tors are crucial to the market process. However, with sovereign debt there 
are no formal priority rules that lay out how different types of claims 
against the distressed sovereign will be treated.33 External creditors of sov-
ereign debt often include private-sector creditors, other governments, and 
multi-lateral creditors.34 Domestic creditors of sovereign debt often include 
domestic banks and pension funds.35   
The 1980s saw a dramatic shift from syndicated bank lending to bonds 
as a source of finance for emerging market sovereigns.36 A syndicated bank 
loan is a commercial bank loan in which a number of banks participate in 
lending. A bond is a form of debt issued by national governments and in-
vestors can often purchase them through exchange-traded funds.37 A sover-
eign looking to raise money issues bonds to tap individual private investors 
or lenders around the world.38 This shift away from syndicated bank loans 
to bonds resulted in much more diversity among creditors, making coordi-
nation more difficult, and has been a barrier to the restructuring process of a 
sovereign in default. In other words, the absence of a clear priority system 
for sovereign bonds has led to a highly diverse set of parties engaging in the 
market each with their own objectives. 
                                                     
32 See e.g. Elisa Beneze, Stopping the Circling Vultures: Restructuring a Solution to Sover-
eign Debt Profiteering, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 245, 247 (2016). 
33 Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS: RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL 
CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 249 (2004).  
34 Id. at 251. 
35
 Id. 
36 Alon Seveg, Investments: When Countries go Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor 
Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 25, 46 (2003). 
37 Justin Kuepper, What are Sovereign Bonds? Everything you need to know about Sover-
eign Bonds, BALANCE (Aug. 6, 2016) https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-sovereign-
bonds-1979114. 
38 Seveg, supra note 36, at 27. 
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C. Holdouts  
The ability to bind all creditors to an in rem resolution is a key feature 
to the success of a typical bankruptcy system.39 However, since no interna-
tional bankruptcy system exists for sovereign debt restructuring, holdouts 
have been a serious problem in sovereign debt restructuring. This is because 
in most cases, a successful restructuring requires a minimum level of ac-
ceptance by creditors to move forward with the restructuring.40 The problem 
of creditor holdouts is widely seen as the main reason for slow and ineffi-
cient debt restructuring. In a holdout scenario, a creditor refuses to partici-
pate in a restructuring process to try to enforce better terms, usually by su-
ing the sovereign debt issuer in a court in New York or London.41  
 
D. Vulture Funds 
Vulture funds are private investment funds that acquire defaulted or 
soon-to-default debt on secondary debt markets.42 The world’s most heavily 
indebted poor countries usually issue the targeted debt. Holdouts are com-
monly vulture funds.43 Vulture funds buy up debts owed by a sovereign in 
financial difficulty at a deep discount and then try to get full payment on the 
debt when the country defaults.44 Vulture funds block effective restructur-
ing and will typically sue the sovereign issuer in a New York or London 
court for full payment.45 Litigation mostly occurs in New York courts be-
cause a large majority of outstanding emerging market bonds are traded on 
exchanges that are subject to New York law.  
 
E. Pari Passu Clause  
The pari passu clause has become a standard clause in international 
unsecured debt obligations and means “with equal step.”46 It ensures that 
                                                     
39 John A. E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout: International Certification 
Boards for Sovereign-Debt Restructurings, 49 TEX. INT’L L. J. 221, 222 (2014).  
40 See DAS, ET AL., supra note 25, at 598. 
41 Id. at 610. 
42 James Bai, Stop Them Circling: Addressing Vulture Funds in Australian Law, 35 SYDNEY 
L. 703, 706 (2013) (citing AFDB, Vulture Funds in the Sovereign Debt Context, 
https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-legal-support-
facility/vulture-funds-in-the-sovereign-debt-context/ (last visited Feb. 16 2018)). 
43 Id.  
44 Seveg, supra note 36, at 38-39.  
45 Id. at 48. 
46 Natalie Wong, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina and the Changing Roles of the 
Pari Passu and Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt Agreements, 53 COLUM. J. 
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bonds within the same issue stand on the same footing without preference 
or priority among themselves.47 The clause has been included in sovereign 
debt contract for over 140 years.48 However, the meaning of the clause re-
mains uncertain and has become quite malleable over the years. Although 
some sovereigns will respect the clause in sovereign debt contracts, in the 
absence of a bankruptcy-like regime to oversee creditors’ claims, the de-
faulting sovereign is left to their own devices.49     
 
F. Collective Action Clauses 
A collective action clause, or CAC, is a provision in a sovereign debt 
contract that allows for modification of the essential payment terms of the 
contract through a supermajority vote. The essential payment terms usually 
include the date of repayment, the amount of the principal, and a coupon.50 
CACs in sovereign debt contracts aim to address the difficulties inherent in 
organizing diverse groups of bondholders.51 Commentators argue that the 
inclusion of CACs can better facilitate creditor-debtor negotiations in a re-
structuring situation, by reducing the hurdle of reaching unanimity on an 
agreement and limiting potential litigation from holdout creditors.52  
The primary problem with CACs is that they typically only apply to a 
single bond issue. Therefore, restructuring requires the activation of a CAC 
for each individual bond issue and approval by a supermajority of each is-
sue’s holders.53 As Jesse Kaplan points out, issuances can be small, making 
it relatively easy for an investor to buy up a big enough position in a single 
debt instrument to block a restructuring.54 Further, the issuance of multiple 
rounds of debt makes the potential for a creditor to take a blocking position 
even more likely. 
 
                                                                                                                           
TRANSNAT’L L. 396, 400 (2015).  
47 Id.  
48 See Jesse Kaplan, Collective Action and the Competence of Courts: The Lessons of NML 
v. Argentina, 20 STAN.  J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 13 (2014). 
49 Id. at 14. 
50 Id. at 21. 
51 Id.  
52 DAS, ET AL., supra note 25, at 612. 
53 See Kaplan, supra note 48, at 27. 
54 Id. 
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III. NML CAPITAL, LTD. V. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA 
A. Argentina’s Debt Crisis 
Argentina’s history with sovereign debt goes back centuries. It has de-
faulted on its external debt seven times.55 Economic prosperity in Argentina 
declined significantly since the 1950s, primarily due to a heavily regulated 
economy.56 In order to satisfy various political needs, Argentine authorities 
continuously spent significantly more than could be raised in taxes.57 Once 
Argentina could no longer tap domestic and international creditors, the re-
course, like often, was hyperinflation.58 A deep recession followed and in-
flation wiped out much of the domestic currency debt of the Argentine gov-
ernment, leaving the dollar-denominated external debt at $80 billion.59 The 
Brady Plan granted the Argentine government access to the international 
capital markets and allowed foreign bonds to finance future public defi-
cits.60  
Between 1993–1998, the Argentine economy generally performed well 
as it received four International Monetary Fund arrangements. An IMF 
lending arrangement, similar to a line of credit, is issued to support a coun-
try’s adjustment program. The arrangement requires the country to observe 
specific terms and is subject to periodic reviews.61 However, even with the 
IMF arrangements, Argentina’s public-sector debt-to-GDP ratio rose by 
12%, indicating an unsustainable fiscal policy.62  
By late 2000, the Argentine government was the largest emerging-
market borrower on international credit markets.63 Markets deemed Argen-
tina’s external debt unsustainable as its debt-to-export ratio increased to 
400%.64 With the public debt on an unsustainable spiral, the IMF reluctant-
ly granted another credit line to prop up central bank reserves.65 When fiscal 
                                                     
55 Shane Roming, Argentina’s Long History of Economic Booms and Busts, WALL STREET J., 
(July 30, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/30/argentinas-long-history-of-
economic-booms-and-busts/. 
56 JOCHEN ANDRITZKY, SOVEREIGN DEFAULT RISK VALUATION: IMPLICATIONS OF DEBT CRISIS 
AND BOND RESTRUCTURINGS 36 (2006).  
57 MICHAEL MUSSA, ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY 10 (2002). 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 See ANDRITZKY, supra note 56, at 36. 
61 See Argentina: History of Lending Arrangements, IMF (May 2015), https://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberKey1=30&date1key=2005-05-31. 
62 See generally MUSSA, supra note 57, at 16 (2002). 
63 See id. at 27. 
64 See ANDRITZKY, supra note 56, at 37. 
65 Id. 
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revenues fell without a corresponding reduction in social spending, default 
became unavoidable on $100 billion in sovereign bonds.66  
At the time of its default, Argentina’s bonded debt amounted to about 
half the global indebtedness and was held both by institutional investors and 
individual holders.67 In 2005, 76% of the defaulted foreign debt was ex-
changed for new restructured bonds worth about twenty-five to twenty-nine 
cents to every dollar owed to the original bonds.68 The second restructuring, 
which took place in 2010, brought the total percentage of original external 
bonds that were exchanged for restructured bonds to 91%.69 The remaining 
holdout creditors that refused to accept the restructuring sued Argentina and 
engaged in over a decade of litigation, which culminated with the NML 
Capital decision.  
B. The NML Capital Decision 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York’s decision in 
NML Capital70 sent shockwaves through sovereign debt markets. Holdout 
creditors that fell into the definition of vulture funds, sued to collect the full 
value of the original bonds that Argentina defaulted on.71 The plaintiffs, 
several vulture hedge funds led by NML Capital, Ltd., included Blue Angel 
Capital, Aurelius Capital Management, Dart Management,  Bracebridge 
Capital, Olifant Fund, and Montreux Partners.72 The bonds contained a pro-
vision that they were governed by the laws of New York and subject to any 
state or federal court in New York City.73 The bonds also contained a pari 
passu clause, which guaranteed bondholders that all claims would be 
ranked equally with all other present and future external indebtedness of 
Argentina.74  
The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was that Argentina violated the 
pari passu clause by paying the creditors who agreed to the restructuring 
without paying the holdout creditors. The court agreed with the plaintiffs 
and held that due to the pari passu clause, if Argentina did not pay the 
                                                     
66 Samples, supra note 16, at 52. 
67 See MEGLIANI, supra note 4, at 37. 
68 Todd, supra note 15, at 273-74. 
69 Id. at 274. 
70 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2012 WL 5895784 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). 
71 See Todd, supra note 15, at 274. 
72 Martin Guzman, Wall Street’s Worst Vulture Hedge Funds are Making a Killing by Un-
dermining the Global Economy, QUARTZ, (June 17, 2016), https://qz.com/707165/wall-
streets-vulture-hedge-funds-are-making-a-killing-by-undermining-the-global-economy/. 
73 See Todd, supra note 15, at 275. 
74 Id. 
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plaintiffs it could not pay any of the other creditors because of the equal 
ranking obligation.75 The court issued an injunction against Argentina.76 
The district court’s narrow application of the pari passu clause in NML 
Capital made sovereign restructuring much more difficult under New York 
law as it incentivized creditors to holdout in the restructuring process for 
more money.77   
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also found for the 
plaintiffs in upholding the district court’s ruling.78 In its decision, the court 
noted that the universal inclusion of collective action clauses would reduce 
the apparent harshness of the District Court’s ratable interpretation of the 
pari passu clause in the future.79 The U.S. Supreme Court denied Argenti-
na’s petition for review of the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Argenti-
na’s obligations.80 As a result, Argentina could not engage in the interna-
tional credit market as it was effectively shut out. 
On February 29, 2016, with a new government in office, Argentina 
agreed to pay the holdout creditors in NML Capital $4.65 billion to settle 
the claims and return to the international credit market.81 Most commenta-
tors thought Argentina would never pay the holdout creditors after the fif-
teen years of contentious litigation. However, when Mauricio Macri suc-
ceeded Christina Fernandez de Kirchner as President of Argentina on 
December 10, 2015, President Macri pledged to return Argentina to credit 
markets by resolving the disputes with the holdout bondholders.82 Argenti-
na’s Congress approved the settlement on March 16, 2016 ending the debt 
battle in a 54-16 vote.83 NML Capital’s original principal amount in claims 
was $617 million but under the settlement NML Capital received $2.28 bil-
lion, about a 370% return.84  
 
                                                     
75 See Kaplan, supra note 48, at 7.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2013). 
79 Id. 
80 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct, 2819 (2014). 
81 Patrick Gillespie, This Fund Made an 800% Return on Argentina Debt, CNN MONEY 
(Mar. 2, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/02/news/economy/hedge-funds-argentina-
debt/. 
82 Sovereign Debt Update, JONES DAY, (June 1, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=4cca27f7-00eb-4258-988c-ec51eb2986ed. 
83 Argentina’s Congress Oks Payments to Holdout Creditors, AGENCIA EFE (Mar. 31, 2016) 
http://www.efe.com/efe/english/business/argentina-s-congress-oks-payments-to-holdout-
creditors/50000265-2883159. 
84 Argentine Sovereign Debt: Exhibit 1, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, http://argentine. 
shearman.com/sitefiles/11592/doc%20904-3.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
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C. The Aftermath 
In reaction to NML Capital, players in the international credit market 
responded with numerous devices to avoid a similar outcome. Since no re-
gime exists for insolvent sovereigns, many market players have advocated 
for Chapter Nine of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to serve as a model for a 
global sovereign bankruptcy regime.85 The prevailing argument is that ad-
judication under a predetermined set of rules by an independent forum will 
produce a much fairer, more certain, and predictable outcome than the un-
predictable ad hoc negotiations that currently resolve these issues.86  
Alternatively, the IMF proposed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (“SDRM”) initiative in 2002. Many lawyers, fund managers, 
and policy makers advocated for this mechanism in order to curtail another 
debt crisis.87 SDRM sought to provide a framework to reinforce incentives 
for a distressed sovereign and its creditors to reach a quick restructuring 
agreement.88 The distressed sovereign would activate the SDRM and facili-
tate a quick restructuring agreement.89  
Ultimately, even though more than 70% of IMF members supported 
the proposal in 2003, leading shareholder countries rejected it.90 The IMF 
has now become reluctant to take the lead on the creation of a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime unless it can convince the leading shareholder countries 
of its efficacy.91 It is unlikely that the United States will back the regime, as 
the United States believes that some of the SDRM provisions would inter-
fere with the contractual claims of U.S. investors.92 
As an alternative to an international bankruptcy regime following the 
NML Capital decision, major banks and banking industry associations pro-
posed the mandatory inclusion of collective action clauses in all sovereign 
bond documents.93 If included, it would mean that creditors agree in ad-
vance to accept the determination of a majority of them, usually a super-
                                                     
85 Ross P. Buckley, The Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 43.3 INT’L 
LAW. 1899, 1203 (2009). 
86 Id. at 1207.  
87 Alan Beattie & Robin Wigglesworth, Bankruptcy Regime for Countries Urged Amid Ar-
gentina Debt Battle, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Jan. 7, 2013), http://go.galegroup.com.turing.library. 
northwestern.edu/ps/i.do?&id=GALE|A314088107&v=2.1&u=northwestern&it=r&p=AON 
E&sw=w&authCount=1. 
88 Molly Ryan, Sovereign Bankruptcy: Why Now and Why not in the IMF, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2473, 2511 (2014).  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 2512. 
91 Beattie & Wigglesworth, supra note 87. 
92 Ryan, supra note 88, at 2512. 
93 See Buckley, supra note 85, at 1208. 
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majority of 75% of creditors, as to any variation of the terms of the debt.94 
This clause is an inverse of a pari passu clause, which requires that credi-
tors be treated equally and repaid pro rata after a sovereign entity becomes 
insolvent.95 CACs effectively weaken a holdout creditor’s position and act 
to streamline the entire debt restructuring process.96  
The Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders (“GCAB”), a repre-
sentative bondholder group formed during Argentina’s restructuring pro-
cess, is an example of collective action benefitting a group of creditors. 
GCAB claimed to represent more than 50% of the outstanding private 
bonds of Argentina in their restructuring.97 GCAB gave 450,000 small 
bondholders some influence in the negotiation process by agreeing to nego-
tiate as a single creditor.98 However, because the other 50% of bondholders 
did not agree to act collectively, the group was limited in its success. 
IV. PUERTO RICAN DEBT CRISIS 
The government of Puerto Rico is facing a severe fiscal crisis. The is-
land’s economy has been in a steady decline for over a decade.99 Forty-five 
percent of Puerto Ricans live below the federal poverty level, compared to 
the United States national average of 16%.100 As a result, residents are bolt-
ing to the mainland United States taking with them valuable jobs and in-
come from the island. Indeed, the statistics from the past ten years reflect 
the greater pattern of brain drain, 300,000 people have fled the island, in-
cluding 84,000 in 2014 alone.101  
Additionally, the remaining population is increasingly older and not 
actively seeking employment.102 The labor force participation in Puerto Ri-
co is about 40%, substantially below the United States average of about 
62%.103 In the last decade, Puerto Rico has experienced declines in both 
GDP output and employment.104 Puerto Rico’s pension system is also at se-
                                                     
94 Id. at 1209. 
95 Bai, supra note 42, at 712. 
96 Id. 
97 See DAS, ET AL., supra note 25, at 605. 
98 See Argentine Bondholders of the World, Unite, MERCOPRESS, (Jan. 13, 2004), 
http://en.mercopress.com/2004/01/13/argentine-bondholders-of-the-world-unite. 
99 Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Budgetary and Economic Outlook for Puerto Rico: Testimony 
to the Senate Finance Committee, 1 (2015). 
100 Puerto Rico’s Economic and Fiscal Crisis, Treasury.gov, at 1, https://www.treasury.gov/ 
connect/blog/Documents/Puerto_Ricos_fiscal_challenges.pdf. (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
101 See id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
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rious risk and its funds will soon be depleted.105 At the end of the 2014 fis-
cal year, Puerto Rico’s three public pension funds held just $2 billion in net 
assets against a combined estimated personal liability of $46 billion.106  
Puerto Rico’s government currently has over $72 billion in debt.107 
This debt represents nearly 70% of the island’s gross domestic product 
(“GDP”), in comparison to the average debt-to-GDP ratio for states in the 
United States at 17%.108 In February 2014, Puerto Rico’s public debt was 
downgraded by the three major credit ratings agencies to below investment 
grade.109 The debt was subsequently downgraded two more times.110 The 
first downgrade was in June 2014 after the government sought to establish a 
restructuring process for debt issued by the island’s public corporations.111 
The public debt was downgraded again in June 2015 after Puerto Rico’s 
Governor Garcia Padilla declared that the island’s debt was unpayable.112 
This led to an inevitable default by the Puerto Rican government of its debt. 
A bright-line rule for identifying a distressed sovereign is when its interest 
on outstanding debt exceeds 10% of its GDP.113 Puerto Rico reached this 
level in March 2015.114 
For decades, there has been an impassioned debate over Puerto Rico’s 
territory status and, as a result, Puerto Rico has never enjoyed full-fledged 
sovereign status. Unlike U.S. cities and states, like Detroit, Puerto Rico 
cannot file for court-arranged bankruptcy reorganization under the United 
States Bankruptcy Code because of its territory status. Furthermore, unlike 
sovereign nations, such as Argentina, Puerto Rico cannot seek emergency 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund. The indeterminate nature 
of Puerto Rico has exacerbated its dire fiscal situation.115 Further complicat-
ing matters, Puerto Ricans lack voting rights at the federal level and are rep-
                                                     
105 Id. at 6. 
106 Id. 
107 Javier Ortiz, The Human Impact of the Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/262512-the-human-impact-of-the-
puerto-rico-debt-crisis. 
108 Greg DePersio, The Origins of the Puerto Rican Debt Crisis, INVESTOPEDIA (May 31, 
2017), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/090915/origins-puerto-rican-debt- 
crisis.asp. 
109 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Basic Financial Statements and Required Supplementary 
Information for FY2013, P.R. DEP’T TREASURY 230-231 (Jun. 30, 2013), 
http://www.hacienda.gobierno.pr/downloads/pdf/cafr/FINANCIAL_REPORT_2013.pdf. 
110 Id. 
111 See AUSTIN, supra note 7, at 4.  
112 Id. 
113 Holtz-Eakin, The Budgetary and Economic Outlook for Puerto Rico, supra note 99, at 9. 
114 Id. 
115 See Diane Lourdes Dick, Tax Imperialism in Puerto Rico, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 5 (2015).  
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resented by only one non-voting Resident Commissioner in the U.S. House 
of Representatives.116  
In 2016, United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Puerto Rico’s territo-
rial status when it held that Puerto Rico would only be able to restructure its 
debt through consensual agreements among the parties or through an Act of 
Congress. The Court’s decision invalidated the Puerto Rico Corporation 
Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (“PR Recovery Act”) that was passed 
in 2014.117 Puerto Rico’s government passed the PR Recovery Act to enable 
certain Puerto Rican instrumentalities to adopt a restructuring plan for their 
debt.118 However, in Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court held that the PR Recovery Act was invalid be-
cause it is preempted by a provision in the United States Bankruptcy Code, 
which prohibits states from enacting their own bankruptcy legislation.119 
This left many creditors unsure of the state of repayment as Puerto Rico 
was defaulting on substantial payment obligations.  
Complicating matters more, unlike other high-profile distressed sover-
eigns, like Greece, Puerto Rico’s debt is not all issued directly by the gov-
ernment.120 Much of the island’s debt is municipal bonds that were issued 
by the government and its various agencies and utilities to help cover reve-
nue shortfalls.121 Each obligor represents varying risk factors for credi-
tors.122 This debt is backed by various revenue streams, as well as $8 billion 
in general obligation debt backed by the “full faith and credit” of the territo-
ry’s government, resulting in a complex array of competing interests.123 The 
number of other entities that have issued debt makes the situation much 
more complicated because the creditors do not share the same economic in-
terest like the reduction of the island’s debt. As a result, Morningstar urges 
investors not to treat all Puerto Rican municipal debtors monolithic.124 
The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) is the primary 
power utility  in Puerto Rico and one of the governmental entities that has 
                                                     
116 Id. at 5-6. 
117 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S.Ct. 1938 (2016). 
118 See Michael K. Piacentini, Lights Out for Puerto Rico’s Restructuring Law? Puerto Ri-
co’s Municipal Bankruptcy Dilemma, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1677, 1679 (2015). 
119 See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1938. 
120 Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico: of Capital Structures, Control Rights and Liquidity, 
11 CAP. MKT. L.J. 228, 232 (2016). 
121 See Piacentini, supra note 118, at 1678. 
122 See CANDICE LEE, State of the Territory, in MORNINGSTART SPECIAL REPORT PUERTO 
RICO FISCAL STRAIN: IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS 5 (2013), http://www.fidelity.com/ 
binpublic/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/PuertoRico_SpecialReport_10-16-13.pdf. 
123 See generally Brown, supra note 19.  
124 LEE, supra note 122, at 2.  
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issued a significant amount of debt.125 In large part, PREPA drives Puerto 
Rico’s debt portfolio as it is responsible for an estimated $9 billion of the 
island’s overall debt of $72 billion.126 Around December 2015, PREPA 
reached a Restructuring Support Agreement (“RSA”) with a group of pri-
vate creditors in an attempt to avert default.127 Under the deal, the creditors 
would accept a 15% haircut to repayments in exchange for higher-rated 
bonds and certain structural reforms within PREPA.128 Puerto Rico’s legis-
lature passed the deal but the future of the agreement is unclear as it has 
been extended fifteen times since it was agreed to.129   
Additionally, Puerto Rico was faced with a financing gap of over $64 
billion over the next ten years.130 For many years, debt in Puerto Rico was 
tax-exempt for investors throughout the United States and paid higher 
yields than average sovereign debt. This made Puerto Rican debt extremely 
attractive to scores of bond mutual funds.131 Bond investors across the Unit-
ed States have taken advantage of these benefits by purchasing Puerto Ri-
co’s bonds. In the face of high demand, the Puerto Rican government issued 
too much bond debt and started relying on borrowed funds to balance its 
unstable budget.132  
Additionally, the types of creditors holding the differing instruments 
are incredibly varied. It has been claimed that $11.3 billion is held by mutu-
al bond funds, $15 billion held by hedge funds, and the rest by individu-
als.133 Among the largest funds that hold Puerto Rico’s debt are Oppenhei-
mer Funds Inc. and Franklin Templeton Investments.134 Once credit rating 
                                                     
125 See Piacentini, supra note 118, at 1678. 
126 PREPA and Creditors Reach Preliminary Agreement, CENTER FOR PUERTO RICAN 
STUDIES, https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/events-news/puerto-rico-news/debt-restructuring/ 
prepa-and-creditors-reach-preliminary-agreement. 
127 Id.; see Stephen Kim Park & Tim R. Samples, Puerto Rico’s Debt Dilemma and Path-
ways Toward Sovereign Solvency, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 9,12 (2017); Executed Version, Restruc-
turing Support Agreement, http://www.gdb-pur.com/investors_resources/documents/ 
PREPA-RSA-RestructuringSupportAgreement-FullyExecuted.pdf. 
128 Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native, Oversight Hearing on “The Status of 
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) Restructuring Support Agreement, 3 
(Mar. 20, 2017) https://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hearing_memo_--_ov_hrg_ 
03.22.17.pdf. 
129 Id. at 1. 
130 Holtz-Eakin, The Budgetary and Economic Outlook for Puerto Rico, supra note 99, at 
12-13. 
131 See generally DePersio, supra note 108. 
132 Id. 
133 Heather Long, Who Owns Puerto Rico’s Debt?, CNN MONEY, (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/01/investing/puerto-rico-bond-holders/. 
134 Id. 
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agencies began downgrading the Puerto Rican debt, benchmark bonds be-
gan to trade as low as thirty cents on the dollar.135 Similar to the situation in 
Argentina, vulture funds began to buy debt on the active secondary market 
with hopes of obtaining a complete dollar repayment plus interest, like the 
NML Capital holdouts were successfully able to accomplish.  
V. CONGRESS RESPONDS BY ENACTING PROMESA 
A. Overview 
PROMESA means “promise” in Spanish. In a controversial, bipartisan 
Congressional effort, the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Eco-
nomic Stability Act, was signed and enacted into law by former U.S. Presi-
dent Barack Obama on June 30, 2016. PROMESA established an Oversight 
Board with broad powers of budgetary and financial control over Puerto Ri-
co’s financial situation.136 The Oversight Board includes seven members 
designated by Congress and the President.137 PROMESA gives the Over-
sight Board power to enact procedures for adjusting debts.138  
The Act contains seven sections. The establishment and organization 
of the Oversight Board is laid out in Title I.139 Title II further defines the re-
sponsibilities of the Oversight Board.140 Title III of the Act creates provi-
sions for Puerto Rico or an instrumentality to file a case to reorganize their 
debts.141 This section incorporates numerous provisions of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code, including many from Chapter Nine. Title IV contains miscel-
laneous provisions, which include establishing the first minimum wage in 
Puerto Rico and an automatic stay on the enforcement of creditor rights on 
financial debt until February 15, 2017.142 Title V outlines the steps the 
Oversight Board will take regarding Puerto Rico’s infrastructure revitaliza-
tion.143 This includes expediting approval of key energy projects and other 
critical projects, as defined by the Act, in Puerto Rico to spur economic 
growth. 
                                                     
135 David Dayen, How Hedge Funds Deepen Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis, AM. PROSPECT, (Dec. 11, 2015), 
http://prospect.org/article/how-hedge-funds-are-pillaging-puerto-rico. 
136 See generally Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act 
(PROMESA), Pub. L. 114-187, § 101, 130 Stat. 549, 553-57 (2016) [hereinafter 
PROMESA]. 
137 Id. at § 101(e). 
138 Id. at § 104.  
139 Id. at §§ 101-09.  
140 Id. at §§ 201-12. 
141 Id. at §§ 301-17. 
142 Id. at §§ 401-13. 
143 Id. at §§ 501-07. 
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This paper focuses on Title VI, which allows for the collective action 
clause and is discussed in detail below.144 Title VII’s brief section ex-
presses the desire of Congress that any durable solution “should include 
permanent, pro-growth fiscal reforms that feature, among other elements, a 
free flow of capital between possession of the United States and the rest of 
the United States.”145 In sum, PROMESA provides two mechanisms to 
address Puerto Rico’s debt crisis: (1) through Title III’s bankruptcy like 
procedure; and (2) Title VI’s collective action mechanism to create negoti-
ated agreements among Puerto Rico and its creditors. This second mecha-
nism, on the focus of this paper, is largely an out of court process. 
B. CACs in PROMESA—Title VI 
Under Title VI, §601 of PROMESA, the Oversight Board will borrow 
the collective action clause model and apply it towards Puerto Rico’s out-
standing bonded debt.146 This is a method adopted to effectuate an overall 
bond restructuring of Puerto Rico or an instrumentality as an alternative to 
the debt adjustment provisions under Title III. Modifications to a bond fi-
nancing can be proposed by the bond issuer, Puerto Rico or one of its in-
strumentalities, or by bondholders.147 This section of PROMESA is unique 
as it is the first law in U.S. history that carves out a period outside of bank-
ruptcy for bondholders to negotiate terms of a restructuring.148  
Title VI, §601(j) addresses how bondholders can agree to modify their 
own bond terms in an attempt to circumvent extensive holdout creditor liti-
gation.149 It states that a qualified modification can be binding on all bond-
holders in the applicable pool of bondholders if:  
(i) holders of at least two-thirds of the pool’s principal who vote ap-
prove the modification; and (ii) holders of at least 50% of the total principal 
outstanding in the pool vote to approve the modification; and finally (iii) 
the modification is approved by the Oversight Board.150   
The inclusion of the CACs provision in Title VI is significant because 
normally the Trust Indenture Act applies to bonds and requires 100% of 
bondholders to agree to the changes on the bond.151 However, in the case of 
                                                     
144 Id. at §§ 601-02. 
145 Id. at § 701. 
146
 Id. at § 601. 
147 Id. at § 601(i). 
148 Robert Slavin, How PROMESA Breaks from Muni Traditions on Collective Actions, 
BOND BUYER, (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/how-promesa-
breaks-from-muni-traditions-on-collective-action-1110556-1.html. 
149 PROMESA, supra note 136, at § 601(j). 
150 Id. 
151 See Slavin, supra note 148. 
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Puerto Rico, PROMESA states that: “provisions of this Act shall prevail 
over any general or specific provisions of territory law, State law, or regula-
tion that is inconsistent with this Act.”152  
In addition, Title VI, §602 states that the process will be governed by 
U.S. law, without regard to any foreign or international law,153 meaning that 
the NML Capital decision will likely apply since most clearing houses are 
governed by New York law. If the CACs fail, the Oversight Board may re-
quest that a court modify the bond terms in a bankruptcy proceeding, simi-
lar to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code process.    
 
C. Drawbacks to PROMESA  
While PROMESA is an innovative solution to Puerto Rico’s debt cri-
sis, the Act has a pretext of colonization. In other words, PROMESA is 
quite paternalistic. Many people have argued that Puerto Rico’s debt crisis 
and long history of economic struggles are a direct result of its inability to 
tackle the problem adequately due to its territorial status and colonial rela-
tionship with the United States.154 PROMESA likely increases Puerto Ri-
cans’ mistrust of the U.S. government, as some view it as an opaque, un-
democratic, form of colonial control.155 To many people, PROMESA is a 
harsh reminder that Puerto Rico remains subject to the territorial clause un-
der the U.S. Constitution. 
Furthermore, the Oversight Board does not provide a seat for any 
Puerto Rican elected officials. As the recent shutdowns of Puerto Rican 
schools and hospitals have demonstrated, the debt crisis is an issue of ut-
most national importance to Puerto Rico. The fact that many of the systemic 
issues which led to the debt crisis can be blamed on the United States high-
lights these colonial comparisons. When enacting such a paternalistic statu-
tory regime, Congress has an obligation to bring transparency to the pro-
cess. 
 
                                                     
152 PROMESA, supra note 136, at § 4. 
153 Id. at § 602. 
154 Dialogo-El Vocero, Protests Against ‘Colonial’ PROMESA Debt Plan Rock Puerto Rico, 
TELESUR, (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Protests-Against-Colonial-
PROMESA-Debt-Plan-Rock-Puerto-Rico-20160901-0015.html. 
155 162 Cong. Rec. H5100 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2016) (statement of Mr. Gutierrez). 
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VI. EFFECTIVE RESTRUCTURING IN PUERTO RICO THROUGH 
CACS 
A. Overview 
PROMESA’s inclusion of Title VI is a relatively economically effi-
cient solution to Puerto Rico’s debt crisis. Title VI is economically efficient 
if the benefit of solving the collective action problem is greater than the cost 
of free riders that result from the implementation of CACs. This section ad-
dresses the cost and benefits of Title VI’s inclusion of CACs. I conclude 
that collective bargaining costs are greater than the cost from free riding. 
Therefore, Title VI is a workable solution for Puerto Rico and future sover-
eign debt crises.   
As previously discussed, PROMESA provides the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities with two restructuring mechanisms 
that are overseen by the Oversight Board. First, Title III §§ 301-317 pro-
vides for a bankruptcy proceeding modeled after Chapter Nine of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. Second, Title VI §§ 601-602 CACs allows for an agree-
ment between Puerto Rico and a majority of creditors that binds dissenting 
creditors. Some people have argued that Title III will mainly be relied on 
instead of Title VI.156 While it is true that in May 2017 the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, which covers only the central government agencies, re-
ceived Board approval to file under Title III,157 Title VI is still relevant as it 
will likely be used by other debtors on the island.  
For instance, in May 2017, the Government Development Bank of 
Puerto Rico (“GDB”) and a majority of its creditors negotiated terms for a 
Restructuring Support Agreement under Title VI provisions.158 The Re-
structuring Support Agreement was approved by the Oversight Board on 
July 12, 2017.159 Once approved by the requisite number of creditors, the 
creditors will be able to exchange their bond claims against GDB through a 
                                                     
156 Richard J. Cooper, et al., Why Puerto Rico Will Likely Rely on PROMESA Title III, 
LAW360, Mar. 1, 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2938608 (arguing Puerto Rico will likely 
rely on Title III because Title VI: (1) contains no automatic stay on creditor litigation upon 
the commencement and during the continuation of the restructuring process; (2) applies only 
to financial debt; and (3) procedural and substantive limitations might be unable to address 
some tax-supported debt issues).  
157 Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Unanimous Written Con-
sent Approving and Issuing Certifications Pursuant to Sections 104 and 206 of PROMSA for 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, May 3, 2017.  
158 Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Unanimous Written Con-
sent Approving Authorization of Certification of Restructuring Support Agreement Pursuant 
to Title VI of PROMESA, July 12, 2017.  
159 Id.  
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menu approach of three tranches of bonds.160 Indeed, the use of Title VI by 
the GDB indicates that Title III is not the only avenue by which Puerto Ri-
co’s restructuring will happen. 
The wide spread and varying claims that Puerto Rico’s creditors hold 
will inevitably lead to serious disagreement between creditors. Each will 
claim they are entitled to seniority of a given revenue in the restructuring 
process. Because Puerto Rico is a territory, it is unable to access Chapter 
Nine of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or seek IMF assistance, thereby adding 
an additional layer of confusion for the parties involved.161 Since much of 
Puerto Rico’s debt portfolio consists of its instrumentalities issuing bonds, 
the challenge of restructuring is rendered even more complex.162 Title VI of 
PROMESA tries to address these complexities with a streamlined process 
of restructuring through a consensual agreement process. This differs from 
a judicially administrated process that would result from a Title III process. 
The inclusion of CACs in Puerto Rico’s bonds benefits most creditors 
and potentially the market as a whole. Under the provision, bonds are 
grouped together according to legal seniority, and any restructuring agree-
ment will require a two-third majority.163 In the restructuring process, credi-
tors are generally willing to renegotiate the terms with the distressed sover-
eign and each take haircuts in order to facilitate some return on their 
investment. For the most part, it is only the vulture funds who are not will-
ing to renegotiate the terms. This is a classic holdout problem. Indeed, the 
NML Capital case incentivizes holdouts. The retroactive inclusion of CACs 
in Puerto Rico’s debt contracts attempts to directly address this collective 
action problem. In other words, the CACs directly target holdouts and force 
them to renegotiate with the sovereign or in this case, the territory. 
The introduction of CACs into Puerto Rico’s public debt contracts puts 
the creditors in the best position to agree to acceptable renegotiated terms 
on their own before judicial interventions. The Act was thoughtfully drafted 
with careful classification rules to ensure that modification meets the best 
interest of creditors test.164 Additionally, CACs act as the functional equiva-
lent of a negotiation forum and incentivizes sovereign debtors to engage 
                                                     
160  Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Fact Sheet Regarding GDB 
Restructuring Support Agreement (“RSA”), July 17, 2017. 
161 See Dick, supra note 115, at 5. 
162 See Rasmussen, supra note 120, at 232. 
163 See Principles Consultative Group, Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt 
Restructuring: Report on Implementation by the Principles Consultative Group, INSTITUTE 
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 11 (Oct. 2016). 
164 Bill for The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stabilization Act 
(PROMESA): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources 10 (2016)(statement of 
Susheel Kirpalani, Chair of Bankruptcy and Restructuring Group, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart 
& Sullivan, LLP). 
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their creditors in a diplomatic matter. The inclusion of CACs can signifi-
cantly streamline the intense negotiations between the defaulter and the 
creditors that often occurs when debt restructuring requires unanimous con-
sent. Thus, CACs offer several clear benefits. First, they create and force a 
negotiation forum. Second, they palliate the issue of holdouts. Finally, 
CACs streamline the often lengthy and expensive restructuring process. 
The collective action problem that CACs seek to solve can become 
very costly and time consuming for creditors. By replacing the unanimous 
consent required under the Trust Indenture Act and allowing the lesser con-
sent requirement laid out in §601(j), the restructuring process is streamlined 
and more cost effective.165 The CAC provision will be triggered to a voting 
pool by a two-thirds vote of the eligible debt, in which holders of at least 
half of the eligible debt participate.166  Ideally, CACs will prevent another 
fifteen-year litigation like the one in NML Capital.167 They also offer an in-
centive for actors in the sovereign debt space to avoid vulture fund-like ac-
tions. While this seriously hampers funds that operate in distressed assets, 
the overall social utility that results from a restructuring agreement greatly 
exceeds the benefits of vulture fund-like behavior.168 
Title VI of PROMESA also has the binding effect of a non-consenting 
pools provision.169 All creditors in a consenting pool, including those that 
did not vote or voted against it, are bound to the modification that was 
agreed to by the necessary votes in that pool.170 While minority creditors 
may have concern, the ability to bind all the creditors in the pool is a neces-
sary component of any effective restructuring authority. It is likely that this 
framework is the only way to bring everyone to the table for any hope of a 
voluntary agreement.171 However, this provision does create a free rider 
problem. With this framework, creditors are incentivized to let others do the 
work required to reach an agreement. Because they are bound by a super-
majority decision, creditors may free ride on the negotiations which could 
result in a less favorable settlement or smaller settlement than if the credi-
tors were vigorously involved. 
Arguably, this free rider problem would result in both under-negation 
or over-negation by the parties. I suspect that the potential for over or under 
negation would not affect Puerto Rico negatively or result in negative re-
                                                     
165 PROMESA, supra note 136, at § 601(j). 
166 Id. 
167 See generally Slavin, supra note 148. 
168 There is greater social utility from restoring basic services to a territorial population than 
the potentially high returns issued by a Vulture Fund. This line of reasoning assumes we at-
tach a high social utility value to basic human life and decency. 
169 PROMESA, supra note 136, § 601(m). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
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sults for the creditors. This free rider problem contrasts with the classic 
public good example of air pollution. In this case, the negative externality 
that might result because of the use of CACs would be a possible decrease 
in number of lenders or bond issuers in the market. In other words, the use 
of the CACs and the subsequent free riding that occurs might result in a 
contraction of the bond market with issuers leaving the market. But, this po-
tential cost must be weighed against the social utility achieved vis a vie the 
implementation of the CACs. I conclude that the social utility generated 
from the use of the CACs is likely higher than the long-term cost to Puerto 
Rico and the contraction of the bond market. 
Another concern that is addressed by the drafting of Title VI is that the 
Oversight Board must also approve the modifications to creditors’ claims. 
The fear is that holdout creditors will aggregate a pool, rendering CACs 
toothless.  These bondholders might organize to ensure that bondholders in 
the other classes provide a similar or greater haircut to their own. Although 
the CAC provision in Title VI does not prevent this aggregation from oc-
curring, the Oversight Board’s check on any pool’s modifications may be 
useful in combatting this potential problem. The Oversight Board must en-
sure that any modification meets the “best interests of creditors’ test” prior 
to approving any modification to a pool of creditors.172 This is an important 
mechanism that decreases transaction costs for the sovereign and disincen-
tives creditors from creating holdout pools. It is a powerful tool that further 
decreases the possibility of holdouts. But, this provision does raise costs for 
creditors. It forces creditors to negotiate with one another instead of using 
capital to buy out other creditors. I suspect that these transaction costs are 
significantly lower than the potential cost of holdouts. Indeed, it is difficult 
to imagine a situation where a holdout is less costly than an inter-creditor 
negotiated agreement. 
CACs concurrently protect and constrain the interests of both creditors 
and debtors. Furthermore, with all things being equal, a creditor should pre-
fer the contractual framework created by the retroactive introduction of the 
CACs into the bond contracts over the uncertainty relating to how the in-
solvent territory will secure relief. The inclusion of the collective action 
clauses is likely in the best interest of all parties, except the potential hold-
out creditors or vulture funds, because it solves the market failure created 
by vulture funds holding out.  
There is a strong moral argument against rewarding so-called vulture 
funds. Economics aside, vulture funds are profiting and preying on the woes 
of a sovereign nation. In the case of Puerto Rico, it is essentially an Ameri-
can state. Arguably, this makes the vulture funds conduct even worse be-
cause they are holding a state hostage and preventing them from participat-
                                                     
172 PROMESA, supra note 136, § 601(g)(B). 
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ing in the bond market. The practical effects of the holdout include unpaid 
workers, limited access to public utilities and blackouts across Puerto Rico. 
The flip side of this argument is that the vulture funds are serving as a 
warning to irresponsible borrowers. But, with an understanding of how the 
United States borrows capital, I think this is a weak argument. 
 
B. Problems with CACs in PROMESA 
Professor Deborah Berman-Santana argues that the passage of 
PROMESA actually puts Wall Street vulture funds in control of most of the 
outstanding debt.173 This has yet to be seen, but the CACs do give the credi-
tors more control over the process than a court-run bankruptcy. In addition, 
because CACs would be retroactively introduced to change individual cred-
itor rights without judicial supervision or accepted notions of due process of 
law, this likely raises some constitutional concerns.174 The Oversight Board 
therefore must take extreme caution to protect the competing creditors’ con-
tractual rights to their best ability. To refine Santana’s point, it is likely that 
large debt holders will have more negotiating power than small creditors. If 
the larger debt holders are vulture funds, then perhaps they will actually 
have more control; without vulture funds holding most of Puerto Rico’s 
sovereign debt, Santana’s argument is overstated. Further, while CACs lim-
it the ability for creditors to holdout for full payment, they might also exac-
erbate the incentives for bondholders to free ride on negotiation costs.175 
Furthermore, Title VI of PROMESA only applies to bond debt, which 
may mean that other liabilities will not be treated in this same way of striv-
ing to achieve compromise.176 Additionally, due to the Act’s requirement 
for each pool of bonds to vote for the modification, and the numerous types 
of pools intertwined in Puerto Rico’s debt, it could be difficult to affect the 
overall process of the restructuring of Puerto Rico’s debt if multiple pools 
fail to come to an agreement. This is the larger problem that is created be-
cause unlike Section 1129(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Puerto Rico 
must make good-faith efforts toward a cooperative deal before initiating a 
cram-down provision.  
Essentially, an entire voting pool could holdout and prevent all other 
creditors from moving forward. However, if they do fail to come to an 
agreement, the process resorts back to the Act’s Title III pseudo-bankruptcy 
                                                     
173 See Michael Nevradakis, Transcript: Interview with Deborah Berman-Santana on Crisis 
in Puerto Rico and Greece (Sept. 30, 2016), http://99getsmart.com/tag/transcript-interview-
with-deborah-berman-santana-on-crises-in-puerto-rico-and-greece/. 
174 Id. at 9. 
175 See WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 308.  
176 Id. at 10. 
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regime through a court process that will impose modifications on the pool’s 
claims. Furthermore, Title VI of PROMESA also only applies to bond debt, 
which may mean that other liabilities will not be treated in this same way. 
A final argument against the inclusion of CACs is that vulture funds 
do not represent a market failure, but rather they are an expression of the 
markets efficiency. At its core, this argument is entwined with libertarian or 
free market economics. Indeed, it is a weak argument. When a firm takes 
advantage of a loophole and subsequently litigates on that issue for fifteen 
years, in the case of Argentina, it is anything but efficient.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although PROMESA has been heavily criticized, the Title VI provi-
sion, which retroactively introduces collective action clauses to sovereign 
debt bond contracts, may effectively combat the vulture funds that were 
able to successfully holdout and block effective restructuring in NML Capi-
tal, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina. Due to Puerto Rico’s immense, varied, 
and competing interests from debt issuers backed by different revenue 
streams and its current defaulting state, CACs are the best option for credi-
tors to receive effective modifications to the essential payment terms of 
Puerto Rico’s sovereign bond contracts.177 Ultimately, combatting vulture 
funds is better for non-holdout sovereign bond creditors who each agree to 
give up a little in order to reach a restructuring agreement. This is especially 
true when an issuer, like Puerto Rico, is in extreme distress.  
The purpose of the sovereign restructuring process is to agree on the 
terms of a debt exchange that will provide some form of debt relief and 
solve the debt crisis so that the sovereign state can return to the internation-
al capital market as soon as possible. In other words, the purpose of the 
sovereign debt restructuring process is not to make creditors extremely 
wealthy – it is to come to an agreement about how much less the sovereign 
will pay its creditors. However, a successful restructuring requires a specific 
minimum threshold of acceptance by creditors to move forward.178 While 
controversial, the inclusion of Title VI’s collective action clause in Puerto 
Rico’s sovereign bond contracts will not only benefit Puerto Rico in stream-
lining their financial woes, but it will also benefit most creditors. Vulture 
funds that took risks on the Puerto Rican debt crisis are most likely to be 
negatively affected by PROMESA’s inclusion of CACs. 
                                                     
177 See generally Brown, supra note 19.  
178 See DAS, ET AL., supra note 25, at 598. 
